

17th May, 1940.

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I have the honour to forward the following report on the operations carried out by the force placed under my command between Friday 10th May, on which day we were embarked at Dover in H.M.S. WHITSHED for Ymuiden, and Wednesday 16th May, when we re-assembled by various routes at Chatham.

The facts mentioned in this report are based on the memories of myself and my officers since all records, together with the majority of the force's gear and personal effects, were lost in the retirement. It is probable that the times mentioned are inaccurate though the sequence of events is believed to be correct.

Friday, 10th May.

3. The Naval Force under my command, together with the naval components of the forces intended for other Netherland ports, were already assembled at Chatham at 2 hours' notice. I had joined my Force the previous day.

4. At 0600 I was informed that Operation XD was to be put into effect. The total naval personnel involved, with the exception of certain officers, left Chatham at 0735 for Dover.

5. One of my Platoon Officers, Lieutenant M.A. Hemans, R.N., who was required for another appointment, was in the process of being relieved by Lieutenant C.D. Madden, R.N. In view of the heavy scale of casualties I was expecting I decided to take both these officers with me. Though, fortunately, events did not justify my reason, the presence of an additional officer was of the greatest value and enabled me not only to undertake a larger share of the defence from the Dutch but also eventually, to do greater damage.

6. On arrival at Dover embarkation commenced. My force, destined for Ymuiden and Amsterdam, embarked in WHITSHED. Lieutenant I.L.T. Hogg, R.N., from H.M.S. VERNON, in charge of the naval demolition party, Captain R. Keeble, R.N., together with a party of two other officers and 30 ranks, forming a military demolition party; and Midshipman J.E. Tabor, R.N.V.R., from H.M.S. KING ALFRED, joined during the forenoon. WHITSHED was sailed at approximately 1200 independently for Ymuiden.

7. Until the arrival of Captain Keeble I was expecting a military force of only 1 officer and 10 other ranks. It appeared uncertain whether it was in fact intended to send the larger party, but, in view of the many attractive targets I felt certain could be found, and of the casualties I expected, I decided to embark all the personnel available.

8. Enemy aircraft were sighted soon after 1500 and 6 to 8 shallow dive bombing attacks were delivered on WHITSHED during the remainder of the passage. The majority of these attacks were ineffective due to the very skilful handling of the WHITSHED by her Commanding Officer, Commander E.R. Condon, R.N. Not only was the enemy aim thrown out by manoeuvre, but, by well judged use of the helm, additional elevation was given to the main armament thus allowing barrage fire to be employed.

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It appeared at the time that one enemy aircraft was hit and this was confirmed later by the Dutch authorities who stated that this aircraft had eventually crashed.

9. On passing Schevingen a number of aircraft were sighted drawn up on the beach. These may have been enemy troop carriers. They were being bombed apparently at the time and two or three were on fire. The use by the enemy of seaplane troop carriers was confirmed by subsequent events and is considered of importance with regard to the defence of this country.

10. Only one bombing attack proved effective against WHITSHED. This was probably the 5th attack. A salvo of high explosive bombs fell close alongside the port quarter of the ship. The flash set alight to the considerable amount of ready-use cordite on X gun deck. The flames from this cordite charred the boxes containing approximately 3 tons of demolition stores stowed in the after lobby. Five men from WHITSHED were either blown or jumped overboard. Casualties occurred from burns and from splinters and are detailed in Appendix I.

11. The Commanding Officer, WHITSHED, consulted me as to the advisability of stopping to pick up his men. I advised him strongly to proceed without stopping as I felt certain further attacks would develop and any delay would jeopardise the object of the operation. He concurred with this opinion though the decision to abandon his men temporarily must have been bitter. Carley floats and life buoys were thrown overboard and a Dutch pilot boat was directed to the vicinity. Later I was informed that one man out of the five had been picked up.

12. The last attack developed as we entered Ymuiden harbour. My force were disposed ready to carry out immediate demolition should the situation demand. We were, however, boarded by a Dutch Naval Officer and it soon became apparent that friendly Dutch Forces were well in control and that no immediate action was necessary. On proceeding alongside I therefore contented myself with sending a small force under Lieutenant Madden to the iron ore quay in order to seize some suitable merchant ships lying there in case early blocking operations were required; in throwing out one platoon to cover my landings; and in employing the remainder of the force in clearing WHITSHED of gear and of getting my explosives under cover.

13. Lieutenant Hogg, my demolition officer, had sustained serious burns to his face and hands. He was in no state to continue his duties. It happened that Lieut. T.C.S. Wilkinson, R.N., Flotilla Torpedo Officer from H.M.S. KNITH, was on board WHITSHED, and so, with the concurrence of Commanding Officer, WHITSHED, I landed this officer in the place of Lieutenant Hogg. His knowledge was invaluable to me.

14. A.B. Gray, of WHITSHED, seriously wounded, was landed and sent to Ymuiden Hospital. He had recovered sufficiently later to be evacuated.

15. As soon as WHITSHED had been cleared she proceeded to search for her men. She returned to harbour during the evening, but, with my complete concurrence, and in view of the wounded on board, certain structural damage, and the probability of renewed attacks on her if she remained in harbour, she shortly sailed.

16. The force I had allocated to Amsterdam, consisting of the R.E. detachment under Captain Keeble, and of three seamen sections under Lieutenant N. Bowden-Smith, R.N., was sent by rail to Amsterdam as soon as possible. A brief summary of their proceedings whilst detached is included in Appendix II. The fact that their task was comparatively straightforward in no way detracts from the complete success they achieved. On their return they proved most valuable to me during the final evacuation.

17. The remainder of the night was spent in establishing the position of our objectives: in posting sentries and patrols in case of surprise by enemy forces or 5th Column elements; in arresting Germans in certain barges and tugs from whom trouble might be expected; and in settling the remainder of the force into temporary quarters in the Militia Headquarters.

18. As regards the arrest of Germans, the attitude of many Dutch military and naval forces may be explained by their unwillingness themselves to arrest German citizens for fear of retaliation later on themselves or their families. This attitude was not general but it did occur that my men were asked to make arrests, or that information was given by civilians to my officers, in preference to the Dutch.

19. During the evening what appeared to be three of our D.S.I. aircraft appeared and flew low over the outer harbour. Magnetic mines were reported to have been laid but none were exploded. The weakness of the A/A Defences must have been a source of satisfaction to these aircraft since they were heartily engaged by the Dutch. It is noteworthy that these were the only British aircraft seen during the whole period I was ashore at Ymuiden. Enemy aircraft were over us continuously.

20. I called on the Fortress Commander, Cdr. Hillingham, as soon as possible. It was a distasteful interview, though made easier than might have been the case by the broadminded loyalty to the Allied cause of this fine officer. We had been cheered enthusiastically on our arrival. I was informed immediately of the arrangements made for the disembarkation and accommodation of the main body assumed to be following us. It was not pleasant to explain that my mission was solely to prepare for the expected defeat of the Dutch.

Saturday, 11th May.

21. During the day a detailed survey of our objectives was made and preparations pressed forward. In the evening at dusk the enemy magnetic mined the inner and outer harbour though they failed to close all the channels. Two merchant ships carrying gold were evacuated and were put in touch with their destroyer escort lying off. Two French sloops entered after dark and left again at early dawn.

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22. I had a long and satisfactory interview with Commander Hillingham during the forenoon at which he explained to me the situation. He had been drained of troops for the front line and had insufficient to man the defensive lines around the town, or to maintain street patrols, against parachute troops or 5th Column attack. Firing at night in the streets and suburbs was frequent. Rumours of parachute landings, and alarms against attack, were practically continuous. The Commandant had been forced to employ naval personnel from his minesweepers to stiffen the line.

23. In order to relieve these minesweepers crews I agreed to take over certain posts with my remaining five sections as I considered the situation would allow the demolition party to continue with their preparations without close cover. As a consequence my force moved to quarters on the south side of the Fishing Harbour, and took over posts in the line facing the dunes to the south which offered a suitable area for parachute descents.

24. The day was comparatively free from actual bombing.

Sunday, 12th May

25. The following bombing attacks occurred during the day:-

- | | |
|---------------|---|
| 0400 to 0600. | Chiefly reconnaissance but some bombing. |
| 0900 to 1000. | Bombing attacks on swing bridge and on merchant ships in harbour. |
| 1230 to 1300. | Bombing attack on merchant ships in harbour. Houses hit within 150 yards of our main demolition shores. |
| 2300 to 0030. | Spasmodic mining and bombing attacks whilst evacuation was being carried out. |

As a consequence I hurried on the dispersal of my explosives and employed the few hands not on duty in making elementary A.R.P. arrangements. The carrying of explosives and the guarding of our dump was carried out by my men in perfect calmness in spite of the frequent raids.

26. I sent Lieutenant Wilkinson to assist the Dutch in equipping a lighter as a "skid" for exploding magnetic mines. This vessel did eventually explode a mine on Tuesday morning to the great satisfaction of the Dutch but not before a minesweeper had been sunk in the harbour by another of these mines.

27. The Consul-General at Amsterdam, Mr. Shepherd, with whom I was in frequent communication, had asked my help to prepare s.s. DOTTEREL for the evacuation of refugees this night, and to assist the embarkation of these refugees at Ymuiden where they were arriving by road and rail. What preparations for their comfort could be made were done with the active assistance of the Master, Captain Green. It had been proposed by the Naval Attaché, The Hague, and it was

understood ...

understood by Captain (D), CODRINGTON, that these evacuees should be embarked in destroyers. I opposed this last minute alteration since the DOTTEREL was prepared and could carry the numbers, although admittedly in discomfort; she was already berthed in the only convenient position and all arrangements for embarkation had been made; and the destroyers would have had to carry some 150 evacuees each which would have adversely affected their offensive power, whereas, as escort to the DOTTEREL, they would be in a position to defend her.

28. I accordingly embarked the evacuees in the DOTTEREL. They arrived at Ymuiden very late and I was concerned to sail DOTTEREL in time to allow her to get well clear before daylight. Although I employed all my men not on duty to assist the evacuees and to carry their considerable luggage the ship was unable to sail until 0100. Embarkation was slowed down by air raids.

29. CODRINGTON and four destroyers entered harbour and secured in the North Lock at about 2100. I was informed of the purpose of the visit by the Dutch. I myself was kept in complete ignorance of the movements of our ships or of our plans, else I would have represented earlier, as I then did by CODRINGTON, the extreme danger involved in the use of the port due to magnetic mines and to air attack. That the danger from mines was real was stressed by the mining of a Dutch merchant vessel carrying additional British refugees and sailed on the same night but after CODRINGTON and DOTTEREL, as well as by other mine explosions in the harbour. The transport of small parties by launch to outside the harbour would have been very easy in the calm weather prevailing.

30. Since Captain (D), CODRINGTON, was fully occupied with the Royal Party he instructed me to consult with the Commanding Officer, M.T.B's, and the Dutch Authorities and to decide whether these three boats were to proceed through the canal. I explained to the Dutch Admiral in command of the Zuyder Zee Forces the limitations of these craft, in particular with regard to torpedo attack against the lock gates of the Zuyder Zee dam due to shallow water, and also with regard to their vulnerability to air attack by day. I decided, however, with the concurrence of their Commanding Officer, to send the boats through, as I considered that they might be of value for night reconnaissance and patrol. They sailed at about 2230.

31. Before CODRINGTON sailed I informed Captain (D) by signal of the above decision and transmitted via CODRINGTON a situation report. S.S. PERSEUS, the third gold carrying ship, was also sailed escorted by a destroyer. A Dutch merchant ship carrying German prisoners was also sailed. She was bombed just outside the harbour and this did much to compensate my men for earlier bombing attacks on themselves.

Monday, 13th May

32. On my return to my quarters at about 0200 I found that my posts and their reserves had been fully engaged in backing up adjacent Dutch posts and in arresting suspects in the street.

At

33. At 0330 I was informed by the Dutch that parachute troops had landed at a point 10 k.m. distant. The majority had been shot on the wing or on landing, but some were still at large. I increased the strength of the posts and the remainder of my force were standing by for the rest of the night.

34. At 0400 an Air Raid Alarm was given. At 1000 a bombing attack was carried out on a merchant ship alongside containing further prisoners. The morale of the prisoners was poor and broke under the strain of the raid. Possibly the effect of the drugged chocolate which these troops carry was beginning to wear off. Another Air Raid Warning was given p.m. but bombing was distant.

35. During the day the placing of charges at land objectives was completed. More suitable block ships were requisitioned and prepared. H.M.S. KIMBERLEY closed the harbour and General Heywood and his mission were dispatched by car. I transmitted a further situation report via KIMBERLEY.

36. Meanwhile the flow of refugees was increasing and my quarters was besieged by British and other nationals demanding passages. This threw a heavy strain on my resources though as much help as possible was provided, particularly to the British. I attempted to concentrate refugees at a large hotel in the suburbs, comparatively free from bombing, where they would be readily available for embarkation as ships passed through. The Dutch Commandant and his officers were of the greatest assistance to me in this respect. The British refugees from the Dutch ship mined the previous night, or those of them who had the nerve to attempt the passage once more, were successfully evacuated at about 2200.

37. Street shooting and parachute troop alarms occurred in the vicinity of several of my posts from 2100 onwards. It became necessary to take over additional posts and the whole of my force was employed for the majority of the night.

38. Captain F.H.T. Ree, R.N. (Retd.) and his staff arrived during these alarms from Amsterdam at about 2300 for accommodation and evacuation. They were put up temporarily at my quarters and were evacuated the next day in two M.T.Bs.

Tuesday 14th May.

39. At 0700 VESPER closed the port with signals. She was boarded outside the harbour. There were three signals which required action; that from the Admiralty stating that H.M. Government had decided on the immediate destruction of the oil stocks at Amsterdam; that from Commander-in-Chief, Nore to the M.T.Bs. warning them not to be cut off; and that requesting transport for a Captain Davis whose destination, mission and plans were unknown to me though he was about to arrive in HAVOCK.

40. I decided to allow Captain Keeble at Amsterdam two hours in which to attempt to obtain Dutch concurrence. I ordered him then to begin the destruction of the oil stocks with or without Dutch consent. My reasons for ordering this delay were:-

- (a) Doubt if the whole stock could be destroyed without Dutch concurrence.

(b) ..

- (b) The fact that our Consul General was still in Amsterdam and his escape might be jeopardised by any display of force on my part.
- (c) The fact that I did not intend to evacuate anyhow before that night and that Captain Keeble would have sufficient time, even allowing for the two hours delay, to complete his task and reach me before then.
- (d) I was confident that should the local situation develop Captain Keeble would set before the expiration of my time limit.

41. I also instructed Captain Keeble and Lieutenant Bowden-Smith to evacuate their force to Ymuiden by road as I suspected that the canal might be mined or attacked. I advised the Consul General to join me immediately.

42. I instructed the Commanding Officer, M.T.Bs that, unless he considered, after consultation with the Admiral in command of the Zuyder Zee, that he could offer further vital assistance to the Dutch, he was to sail so as to leave Ymuiden that night.

43. A signal was sent to the Admiralty to the above effect through VESPER and stressing my opinion that the dangers from mines and from air attack made it unjustifiable to send destroyers into the harbour to assist with my evacuation.

44. I then had a final conference with my officers and sent the whole of my force to their pre-arranged Action Stations.

45. At 1330 HAVOCK entered harbour by the mined channel. She disembarked Captain Davis. With the concurrence of the Commanding Officer I embarked the only handful of refugees immediately available and sailed HAVOCK again as quickly as possible. I asked her to close again at 2200. An air attack developed shortly afterwards. Captain Davis was sent to Amsterdam in the official car placed at my disposal. He returned in time to evacuate in the M.T.Bs.

Work of Demolition and of Blocking.

46. I myself joined the Commandant so that I could have the latest intelligence, could, if necessary, influence his decisions, and from where I was in telephonic and V/S touch with my scattered forces at their stations. At 1430 the party from Amsterdam joined me and proceeded to the stations allotted them. The M.T.Bs also arrived and I instructed them to avail themselves of the cover and protection of the lock walls until it was safe to sail after dark.

47. With the assistance of the Commandant four cot cases and four walking cases were evacuated from the Hospital to a merchant ship. These included A.B. Gray ex WHITSHED.

48. At 1630 an air raid took place and the fort opened fire on some undefined targets. At 1630, after consultation

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with the Commandant, I ordered Lieutenant Heman and Lieutenant Bowden-Smith to proceed with their tasks. Mr. Bingham of the Consulate Staff, Amsterdam, attached himself, at my request, to Lieutenant Heman and showed himself both resourceful and gallant. His services played a large part in the success achieved.

49. Lieutenant Bowden-Smith, with the assistance of the Dutch placed the block ship in the South Channel and sank her across the fairway. She had previously been filled with some hundreds of tons of iron ore. A Dutch trawler was sunk under her stern to close the gap. I consider it unlikely that more than light craft are now likely to use this channel and only then in fair weather. The removal of the blockships should take some time. Lieutenant Heman sustained a nasty cut in his head whilst carrying out this task but continued to carry out good work, attaching himself to Lieutenant Madden.

50. Lieutenant Heman, assisted by Mid. Tabor and Mr. Bingham proceeded to sink:-

- 1 large floating crane
- 4 motor drifters not being evacuated
- 4 tugs not being evacuated
- Several large lighters

In addition two floating docks were blown up and two tugs were sunk so as to block the entrance to the small southernmost hand-worked locks.

51. Lieutenant Heman and his party then equipped a launch with twin LQs on A.A. mountings and began embarking his force with their gear ready for evacuation.

52. During this time Captain Keeble had relieved the Dutch at various positions commanding the lock approaches from the south both as an insurance against a change of mind by the Dutch and so as to enable those Dutch who intended to evacuate to make their preparations. He and his force later embarked with Lieutenant Heman and at 2025 proceeded out of harbour to await me. At 2130 they were subjected to numerous M.G. attacks by aircraft and, in accordance with my instructions, transferred to a larger Dutch Coaster and, after further M.G. attacks, sailed. Later they transferred to HAVOCK and were landed at Harwich.

53. Before sailing, HAVOCK instructed two M.T.Bs to close later in the hope of picking up myself with the rear-guard. They were subjected also to M.G. attacks, bringing down one plane, but failed to contact with my party.

54. At about 1730 I was informed by the Commandant that Holland had surrendered. Orders, ostensibly from Dutch H.Q., were received that the Dutch were immediately to lay down their arms, all demolition was to cease, and, I understood, our evacuation was to be stopped. This change of plan and conflicting orders from the High Command caused confusion and doubt in the minds of the Dutch. Their thoughts turned to the families they had intended to leave behind whilst they themselves left to continue fighting. They wavered. The Commandant alone was sure of his duty. He cancelled the order, went round with me in an M.T.B. I placed at disposal, rallied his troops, and, by his action not only enabled us to complete our demolition but, by persuading the military to

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hold out, allowed our retirement and that of himself and his naval forces. The scenes between the naval ratings and their families were distressing and payed tribute both to the personal influence of the Commandant as well as to the fighting determination of the naval personnel.

55. I then instructed, at about 1830, Lieutenant Madden to begin moving out the large blockship to the entrance and Lieutenant Wilkinson to carry out all the demolition he could without stopping the last trickle of shipping through the North Lock. I ordered this lock to be closed at 2000.

56. Lieutenant Wilkinson first sank the dredger and several hoppers. He sent an S.T. A.B. Kegan, with a small party to the iron works where the main control board was blown up and other structural damage achieved. He then commenced blowing up the lock machinery, completing the last lock about 2030.

57. After consultation with the Commandant I had decided not to blow down the lock gates, since this would not prevent the passage of ships at all tides, and also such action would have flooded the poorer quarters of Amsterdam where Dutch people would still be living. Instead the gates were shut; the main power stations for the lock gates were blown up; the machinery of the North and South side of the North Lock, and the machinery of the North side of the middle lock was blown up; the hand worked gates of the little South lock were jammed with loads of stone ballast and two tugs were sunk in the approach to this lock.

58. Lieutenant Wilkinson remained with a few sailors to complete the demolition and sailed the remainder of his party at about 1930, together with the balance of the R.Es, in a pilot ship. This vessel, with a pilot master and P.O. Blackwell in charge was attacked by aircraft off the entrance and so proceeded independently in accordance with my instructions. This vessel was successfully navigated across to the Downs by the Pilot Master and P.O. Blackwell with the aid of charts borrowed from a trawler, regardless of any hazards such as minefields.

59. Lieutenant Wilkinson eventually joined me off the entrance in a rowing boat after sinking two abandoned pilot ships he passed on his way.

60. By 2000 Lieutenant Madden has cast off the 11,000 ton liner J.P. Coen and was moving towards the entrance. Lieutenant Bowden-Smith took charge of the after tug and the Commandant, Commander Hellingham, of the bow tug. Whilst they were proceeding down harbour I went round the harbour and locks in a motor boat to make sure that no stragglers had been left. Shooting was taking place in the streets. The Dutch Minesweepers were all under way and it appeared that all effective craft had either sailed or been sunk. A merchant ship alongside the iron-ore quay had been sunk by Lieutenant Madden before he left. I found two Dutch midshipmen on board the sinking Dutch harbour defence vessel and took them with me. This vessel was incapable of steaming.

61. The Dutch merchant ship carrying German prisoners and evacuees, as well as a Dutch merchant ship from Amsterdam

carrying/

carrying evacuees, had sailed and were clear. I therefore rejoined the last blockship.

62. At about 2200 as the blockship was approaching the entrance further determined air attacks developed. It appeared that enemy aircraft had been sent to mine up the harbour in preparation for our anticipated departure on the morrow. On finding us already on the move they carried out a succession of low M.G. attacks and bombed us with magnetic mines on parachutes. These exploded on impact with the land after a delay of some seconds, and made a very fierce explosion. The aim of the aircraft was poor though their M.G. fire with tracers was accurate. Fortunately only a handful of personnel remained in the blockship and tugs and no casualties occurred.

63. The J.P. Coen was sunk upright and accurately between the pier heads. A gap of some 20 yards existed under her stern. This was filled with the trawler which we had reserved for our retreat.

64. The rearguard of Dutch and British then proceeded at about 2300 in a harbour launch to the rendezvous. Since the rest of the force had scattered after being attacked we also proceeded, shaping a course well out to sea so as to avoid further air attack on the next day.

65. At 1600 on Wednesday 15th some 40' to the east of the N. Foreland, we, together with some Dutch refugees in a motor boat, were picked up by VENOMOUS and later landed at Dover. This was fortunate since the change in plan involved by sinking the trawler had entailed us sailing without food or water, without an anchor, and, at the time of recovery, with a bare 20 miles of fuel remaining.

66. A summary of the demolition believed to be accomplished is given in Appendix III. Recommendations of officers and men considered deserving of special mention are contained in Appendix IV.

67. In accordance with the verbal instructions of Captain Hon.C.P. Herman Hodge, D.S.O.,R.N. this report is submitted direct to you.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) M.G. GOODENOUGH.

Commander, R.N.

Director of Operations-Division (Home).

(Copy to:- Captain Hon. C.P. Herman Hodge, D.S.O.,R.N.)
Commodore, R.N. Barracks, Chatham)

APPENDIX I

Casualties to Force XD "A".

In H.M.S. WHITSHEP

Officers: Lieutenant Hogg severely burnt
returned in WHITSHEP.

Commander M.G. Goodenough } slight splinter
Lieutenant Madden } wounds.
Lieutenant Herman } slight burns.

Men: P.O. Chittenden } believed wounded by splinters
A.B. Horne } and burnt, returned in WHITSHEP.

At Ymuiden

Officers: Lieutenant Bowden Smith scalp wound during
demolition work.

Missing

Men OD(H.O.) Scaman. This rating was seen shortly
before embarkation. It is possible that he may have
failed to embark or may have become a casualty during
the air raid on passage. It is probable however that
he remained asleep during a transfer to some other
craft and will materialise. Details are being checked
on the return of the force from leave.

APPENDIX II.

Operations at Amsterdam.

On arrival by train at Amsterdam the R.N. and R.N.

detachments were met by a Dutch Naval Officer. Since he refused to direct them, or to allow them to proceed, to their targets they requested to be taken to the Consulate. Here the Consul General arranged for them to be accommodated in the Naval Barracks whilst he telephoned The Hague.

2. It was not until Saturday p.m., and after an interview with the Commandant, that the force was allowed to proceed to their objectives. Thus, if an emergency had occurred, the operation at Amsterdam would have failed due to lack of preparation by the Consular Staff.

3. The force was split between the Benzine, Shell and Petrol installations where each detachment was billeted. The time passed uneventfully in perfecting arrangements. No air raids came near the installations.

4. Detailed plans to suit the existing wind were made p.m. Monday on receiving a "stand-by" warning from me.

5. On receiving my orders, a.m. Tuesday 14th, to attempt to obtain Dutch concurrence but, at the end of two hours, to begin demolition, Captain Keeble took the following action:-

- (a) Telephoned the local Commandant who refused permission.
- (b) Telephoned Dutch H.Q. at The Hague who approved demolition.
- (c) Telephoned the local Commandant, who, after himself checking with The Hague, finally approved the operations.

6. Thus demolition began at approximately 1000 with Dutch concurrence. Benzine Haven and the Shell Installation were completed by 1230, and Petrol Haven by 1400. The several parties then concentrated and proceeded by road to Ymuiden. The change in plan from water to road retirement ordered by me entailed leaving a considerable amount of gear behind.